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CLIENT PERJURY AND THE CON-
STITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE
CRIMINAL DEFENDANT
Nix v. Whiteside'
Perhaps the most difficult ethical dilemma an attorney may be con-
fronted with is determining the proper response upon learning that a client
has committed or is planning to commit perjury. The problem is a natural
result of the adversary system, and the commentary has failed to provide
clear guidelines for practicing attorneys.2 Further, when the client is a crim-
inal defendant, the situation takes on constitutional dimensions. The United
States Supreme Court addressed this issue recently in Nix v. Whiteside,3 in
which a criminal defendant convicted of murder claimed that his attorney's
response to his plan to present perjured testimony constituted a denial of his
sixth amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. It was hoped
that the Court would use this case as an opportunity to provide some guidance
for practitioners faced with perjurious defendants.4 This Note will examine
the inherent conflicts which arise when a client proposes perjury, the guidance
provided by the Court in Nix v. Whiteside, and the questions left unanswered
by the decision.
1. 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986).
2. See generally Wolfram, Client Perjury, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 809 (1977);
Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three
Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1469 (1966); Noonan, The Purposes of Ad-
vocacy and the Limits of Confidentiality, 64 MIcH. L. REv. 1485 (1966); Brazil,
Unanticipated Client Perjury and the Collision of Rules of Ethics, Evidence, and
Constitutional Law, 44 Mo. L. REv. 601 (1979); Callan & David, Professional Re-
sponsibility and Duty of Confidentiality: Disclosure of Client Misconduct in an Ad-
versary System, 29 RUTGERS L. REv. 332 (1976); Erickson, The Perjurious Defendant:
A Proposed Solution to the Defense Lawyer's Conflicting Ethical Obligations to the
Court and his Client, 59 DEN. L.J. 75 (1981).
3. 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986).
4. Reiger, Client Perjury: A Proposed Resolution of the Constitutional and
Ethical Issues, 70 MINN. L. REv. 121 (1985).
The issue of client perjury cries out for guidance from the Supreme
Court, and some direction may be forthcoming. The Court has agreed to
review an Eighth Circuit case granting relief to a criminal defendant pre-
vented by his lawyer from giving false testimony. Although the case may
not be the ideal vehicle for settling the highly controversial issue it should
nonetheless provide some guidance to lawyers faced with client perjury.
Id. at 121 (footnotes omitted).
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Emmanuel Charles Whiteside was convicted of second degree murder
for a killing that took place in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, in February 1977. He
had gone with two other men to the apartment of the deceased, Calvin Love,
intending to purchase marijuana. Love was in bed when they arrived and
when an argument ensued Whiteside fatally stabbed Love in the chest.5
Whiteside claimed the stabbing was in self-defense. Love had a repu-
tation for violence and was known to carry weapons, and Whiteside claimed
that he believed Love was reaching for a gun beneath his pillow when he
stabbed him. 6 No one present actually saw a gun, nor was any gun found
by the police.7 After Whiteside objected to the lawyer initially appointed to
represent him because he felt uncomfortable with a lawyer who had formerly
been a prosecutor, Gary Robinson was appointed to represent Whiteside at
trial. In preparation for trial, Whiteside admitted to Robinson that he had
not actually seen a gun, but that he "knew" Love had one.8 Although
Robinson had told Whiteside that the presence of the gun was not essential
to a self-defense claim so long as Whiteside had had a reasonable belief he
was in danger, Whiteside remained anxious about his self-defense claim be-
cause a gun had not been found.9 Shortly before trial, Whiteside informed
Robinson that he intended to testify that he had seen something metallic in
Love's hand, telling Robinson, " If I don't say I saw a gun, I'm dead."' 0
Robinson believed that Whiteside was proposing to commit perjury and
felt that, as an officer of the court, he could not allow such testimony. After
futile attempts to dissuade Whiteside from so testifying, Robinson informed
him that if Whiteside perjured himself, Robinson would: 1) inform the court
that he believed his client was committing perjury, 2) seek to withdraw from
the case, and 3) probably be allowed to impeach that particular testimony.
Whiteside acquiesced, and upon taking the stand testified only to the effect
that he "knew" Love had a gun. On cross-examination the prosecutor elicited
the admission that Whiteside had not actually seen a gun, and Whiteside
was ultimately convicted."
On appeal Whiteside claimed that Robinson's actions had denied him
the effective assistance of counsel. The Iowa Supreme Court rejected White-
side's claim that his proposed testimony represented a truthful account of
the events, agreeing with Robinson that such testimony would have amounted
5. Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. 988, 991 (1986).
6. Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d 1323, 1325 (8th Cir. 1984), rev'd sub nom.
Nix v. Whitesides, 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986).
7. Id.
8. Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. at 991.
9. Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d 1323, 1325 (8th Cir. 1984), rev'd sub nom.
Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986).
10. Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. 988, 991 (1986).
11. Id. at 992.
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to perjury.' 2 The Iowa Supreme Court held that Robinson's actions were
proper, and commended him for the "high ethical manner" in which the
matter was handled.' 3
Whiteside then unsuccessfully petitioned the Federal District Court for
the Southern District of Iowa for a writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the denial of the writ. 14
The court of appeals claimed its decision was not based on ethical claims,
but was founded solely on constitutional grounds. Although accepting as true
the state court's determination that Whiteside's proposed testimony would
have been perjurious, the court of appeals maintained that Whiteside never-
theless had not waived his due process rights or his right to the effective
assistance of counsel, and that Robinson's actions effectively denied White-
side these rights. 5 The court ruled that Robinson's conflicting ethical obli-
gations to the court and his client amounted to a conflict of interest which
was prejudicial under Strickland v. Washington,'6 and that, as a result, Ro-
binson ceased to be an effective advocate for his client as required by the
Constitution. The court held further that Robinson impermissibly compro-
mised Whiteside's right to testify by conditioning confidentiality and contin-
ued representation on his testifying in a manner that corresponded to
Robinson's view of the truth. 7 The Supreme Court reversed the decision of
the court of appeals and reinstated Whiteside's conviction. Writing for the
Court, Chief Justice Burger found that Whiteside had failed to meet the
requirements established by Strickland v. Washington's for a claim of inef-
fective counsel, and rejected the argument that the different ethical consid-
erations before Robinson amounted to a conflict of interest from which
prejudice should be presumed.' 9 As a result, Robinson's response to White-
side's attempted perjury was not found to have violated Whiteside's consti-
tutional rights.
The dilemma confronting an attorney when a client proposes perjury is
an inescapable consequence of the adversary system. "The very premise of
our adversary system of criminal justice is that partisan advocacy on both
12. State v. Whiteside, 272 N.W.2d 468, 471 (Iowa 1978).
13. Id. The Supreme Court of Iowa found the actions of Robinson to be
vindicated by Canons 4 and 7 of the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for
Lawyers, as well as § 721.2 of the Iowa Code (now § 720.3 Supp. 1977) dealing with
the crime of subornation of perjury. There seems to be no place in the decision where
the court actually held that Robinson's actions were required by law as stated in the
opinion by Chief Justice Burger in Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. at 992.
14. Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir. 1984), rev'd sub nom. Nix v.
Whitesides, 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986).
15. Whiteside v. Scurr, 774 F.2d at 1328.
16. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
17. Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d at 1329.
18. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
19. Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. 988, 999 (1986).
1987]
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sides of a case will best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be
convicted and the innocent go free." 20 Since such a system operates on the
assumption that spirited debate by interested parties is the best means of
bringing all pertinent factors before the decision-maker, the system demands
that the attorney zealously defend the interests of his client,2' and this is
reflected in the different bodies of law that govern the behavior of members
of the legal profession. 22 Model Code of Professional Responsibility Canon
7 mandates that an attorney repregent a client zealously within the bounds
of the law.23 The American Bar Association's Standards Relating to the
Administration of Criminal Justice24 require the defense lawyer to serve as
the accused's counselor and advocate with "courage, devotion, and to the
utmost of his or her learning and ability and according to the law." ' 25 The
ethical attorney is dedicated to his client's cause and will not divulge his
client's confidences. 26 Moreover, an ethical attorney will not endanger rep-
20. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975) (Stewart, J.). While many
of the same conflicts arise in the context of a civil lawsuit, the constitutional rights
of a criminal defendant complicate the decision as to what types of response are
permitted. Accordingly, this Note is concerned solely with a criminal setting.
21. Devotion to the client was understood to be essential to the role of defense
counsel in a number of sixth amendment cases. "The right to counsel guaranteed by
the Constitution contemplates the services of an attorney devoted solely to the interests
of his client." Von Molkte v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 725 (1948) (Black, J.); See also
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942); cf. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S.
648, 656 (1984) ("The right to the effective assistance of counsel is thus the right of
the accused to require the prosecution's case to survive the crucible of meaningful
adversarial testing .... [I]f the process loses its character as a confrontation between
adversaries, the constitutional guarantee is violated."); Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S.
745, 758 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (to satisfy the Constitution, counsel must
function as an advocate for the defendant as opposed to a friend of the court).
22. The most significant bodies of law regarding legal ethics are the American
Bar Association's MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsIBILITY (1982), MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983), and STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION
OF CR IINAL JUSTICE (1982). Iowa has adopted a version of the Model Code in the
IOWA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR LAWYERS (1986), but has not adopted
the Model Rules. The Model Code is a three-tiered structure consisting of general
axioms with accompanying ethical considerations and disciplinary rules. While ethical
considerations are aspirational in nature, the disciplinary rules are intended to be
mandatory and represent a minimum standard of conduct below which attorneys are
not allowed to go.
23. This maxim is repeated in MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsILrrY
EC 7-1, which provides that the law includes disciplinary rules and enforceable profes-
sional regulations, but MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-2, rec-
ognizes that the bounds of the law may be difficult to ascertain. MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-3, directs the lawyer when functioning as advocate
to resolve any doubts in favor of his client.
24. STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMNAL JUSTICE § 4-
1.1(b) (1982).
25. Id.
26. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSmIITY EC 4-1, provides that both
[Vol. 52
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resentation of his client's interests by subjecting himself to conflicts of in-
terests. 27 Plainly, the adversary model envisions an attorney dedicated solely
to the interests of his client and willing to use all his abilities to further those
interests.
28
However, the adversary system is subject to abuse if its participants are
unchecked, and thus the advocate's dedication must be subject to limitations.
In order for the system to operate effectively as a search for the truth, its
integrity must be carefully guarded. 29 This is reflected in the ethical prohi-
bitions against the knowing use of false evidence." Similarly, an attorney
cannot rely on the attorney-client privilege to justify his silence while his
client perpetrates a crime.
3
'
An attorney is thus faced with a difficult conflict of ethical concerns
when a client proposes perjury. As an officer of the court, he is sworn to
the fiduciary relationship existing between the lawyer and client and the proper func-
tioning of the legal system require the preservation by the lawyer of confidences and
secrets of one who has employed or sought to employ him. MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONsiBiLITY DR 4-101(B)(1), provides that a lawyer shall not knowingly
reveal a client confidence.
Similarly, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRMINAL. JUSTICE
§ 4-3.1(a), states that defense counsel should seek to establish a relationship of trust,
and explain the necessity for full disclosure while assuring the client that the lawyer
is under an obligation of confidentiality.
27. MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONA.L CoNDucT Rule 1.7 comment (1983), main-
tains that loyalty is an essential element in a lawyer's representation of a client. An
impermissible conflict of interest may exist before representation is undertaken, in
which event the representation should be declined. If such a conflict arises after
representation has been undertaken, the lawyer should withdraw from representation.
28. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (O'Conner, J.):
Representation of a criminal defendant entails certain basic duties. Counsel's
function is to assist the defendant, and hence counsel owes the client a duty
of loyalty, a duty to avoid conflicts of interest. From counsel's function as
assistant to the defendant derive the overarching duty to advocate the defend-
ant's cause....
Id. at 688.
29. See Noonan, The Purposes of Advocacy and The Limits of Confiden-
tiality, 64 MIcH. L. REv. 1485 (1966).
30. MODEL CODE OF PROrESsIoNAL RESPONsmfrry DR 7-102(A)(4), prohibits
an attorney from knowingly using perjured testimony or false evidence, and MODEL
CODE OF PROFEssIONAL RESPONSimBrT DR 7-102(A)(7), prohibits counsel from as-
sisting the client in conduct that is illegal or fraudulent. MODEL RULEs OF PROFnS-
SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(4), similarly provides that a lawyer shall not offer evidence
that the lawyer knows to be false.
31. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsBIUrTY DR 4-101(C)(3), allows an
attorney to reveal the intention of his client to commit a crime, and the information
necessary to prevent the crime. However, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.6(b)(1), qualifies this exception, allowing the attorney to reveal client confi-
dences only where the crime would threaten serious harm or loss of life. The wording
of Rule 1.6(b)(1) apparently would not allow revealing client confidences to expose
an intent to commit perjury.
1987]
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uphold the integrity of the fact-finding process. As an ethical lawyer he is
bound to refrain from the knowing use of false evidence. Perjury is a crime
in most states, and he arguably is not entitled to remain silent while his client
commits a crime.3 2 On the other hand, he owes a duty of loyalty to his client,
and the obligation to maintain client confidences is a fundamental part of
the attorney-client relationship. It is clear that the attorney cannot easily
fulfill one set of obligations without compromising the other.
Even if the proper response to client perjury may be ascertained from
the ethical codes, there may be a conflict between the lawyer's ethical re-
sponse and the constitutional rights guaranteed the criminal defendant. Such
a situation forces an attorney to choose whether to commit a possible vio-
lation of his client's constitutional rights or to risk violating the ethical
mandates of his jurisdiction and face possible disciplinary action. 3 The fol-
lowing discussion will deal with the different approaches to client perjury
that have been suggested, and the constitutional ramifications of each ap-
proach in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Nix v. Whiteside.
The threshold issue in finding the proper response to a client's proposal
to commit perjury is to determine the basis for the attorney's belief that the
suggested testimony would be perjurious. In deciding Whiteside v. Scurr,3 4
the court of appeals emphasized that the ethical authorities presuppose that
defense counsel actually know that the testimony will be false. Mere suspicion
or inconsistent statements alone are insufficient to establish the falsity of the
testimony.35 The attorney should remember that his duty is to defend his
client, not to judge him. It is the role of the judge or jury to determine the
facts, not the attorney, and thus counsel should act only if he has a firm
factual basis for believing that the defendant will testify falsely.3 6
32. See supra note 30. See generally Callan & David, Professional Respon-
sibility and Duty of Confidentiality: Disclosure of Client Misconduct in an Adversary
System, 29 RUTGERs L. Rv. 332 (1976).
33. See Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir. 1984). The court did not
disagree with the state court determination that Robinson had behaved properly under
the code of professional responsibility for that state. Instead, it held that such codes
are necessarily subject to the Constitution and must give way in case of conflict. The
court went on to declare that an attorney who is forced to cooperate in the presen-
tation of perjured testimony due to the mandates of the Constitution cannot be subject
to disciplinary action for doing so. The practical difficulty with this analysis is that
the attorney cannot accurately predict beforehand if his actions are going to be deemed
to have been required by the Constitution or were, in fact, ethical violations.
34. 744 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir. 1984), rev'd sub nom. Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S.
Ct. 988 (1986).
35. Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d 1323, 1328 (8th Cir. 1984), rev'd sub nom.
Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986); cf. Johnson v. United States, 404 A.2d 162(D.C. 1979) (inconsistency between two proffered defenses was insufficient to establish
that the second proffer, the intended testimony, was false).
36. United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 122 (3d Cir. 1977).
[Vol. 52
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In Whiteside's case, however, the state supreme court had made a factual
finding that Robinson was justified in his belief that Whiteside was planning
perjury.37 Since that finding was supported by the evidence, the court of
appeals accepted it as true, but also stated that it would be a rare case in
which the factual requirements would be met. 38
Once the factual requirements are satisfied and the attorney is certain
that his client intends to commit perjury, the attorney must decide how to
handle the matter. The authorities agree that the first step an attorney should
take is to attempt to dissuade the client from the "fraudulent" conduct.
39
In this context, it is clear that Robinson's actions can be vindicated on ethical
grounds. His threats to withdraw and inform the court of his belief that
Whiteside was committing perjury can easily be viewed as remonstrating with
the client against committing perjury. Since he was successful in convincing
Whiteside to testify truthfully, Robinson did not violate his duty to refrain
from using false evidence, and he was not forced to reveal client confidences
or to testify against his own client in order to accomplish this goal. The
Court was satisfied that Robinson had ably presented Whiteside's legal de-
fenses to the jury,4 thereby fulfilling his duty to loyally and competently
advocate his client's cause within the bounds of the law. 4'
An additional issue at this stage is what steps an attorney is required to take in order
to know whether his client is testifying truthfully. The attorney should make some
investigation into the case in order to competently represent his client. However, it
would seem inconsistent with the duty of loyalty for this investigation to be conducted
for the purpose of proving that one's client is a liar. See generally Wolfram, Client
Perjury, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 809 (1977); STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADhNISTRATION
OF CRIMNAL JUSTICE § 4-4.1 (1983).
37. State v. Whiteside, 272 N.W.2d 468, 471 (Iowa 1978).
38. "Counsel must remember that they are not triers of fact but advocates.
In most cases a client's credibility will be a question for the jury." Whiteside v.
Scurr, 744 F.2d at 1328.
39. See, e.g., Wolfram, Client Perjury, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 809, 846 (1977);
Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three
Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1469, 1477 (1966); STANDARDS RELATING TO
THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRMHNAL JUSTICE § 4-7.7 (1982). Wolfram maintains that
the required remonstration consists of five elements: advising the client that false
testimony may be a crime, advising the client of the strategic risks of giving false
testimony, urging the client to testify truthfully, advising the client that false testimony
may cause the lawyer to withdraw from representation, and, where the jurisdiction
requires it, informing the client that the attorney may be required to disclose the
client's perjury. Wolfram, supra, at 847.
40. This was especially true in that Robinson had informed Whiteside that it
was not necessary for him to have actually seen a gun to maintain a successful defense,
so long as he had a reasonable fear that Love had a gun. Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S.
Ct. at 993.
41. Id. at 997 (Burger, C.J.):
Whiteside did testify.., and was aided by Robinson in developing the
basis for the fear that Love was reaching for a gun. Robinson divulged no
1987]
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The court of appeals, in reversing Whiteside's conviction, reasoned that
although Robinson initially acted properly in his efforts to dissuade Whiteside
from committing perjury, he went so far as to effectively become an adver-
sary rather than advocate. Particularly damning in the eyes of the appellate
court was its understanding that Robinson's threat to impeach the false
testimony was a threat to actually take the stand and testify as a prosecution
witness on rebuttal. In the words of the court, "Surely a lawyer who actually
testified against his own client could not be said to be rendering effective
assistance. The same is true, we think, of a lawyer who threatens to testify
against his own client." '42 The Supreme Court was unpersuaded, however,
and reversed the court of appeals. The Court said:
Whether Robinson's conduct is seen as a successful attempt to dissuade his
client from committing perjury, or whether seen as a "threat" to withdraw
from representation and disclose the illegal scheme, Robinson's represen-
tation of Whiteside falls well within accepted standards of professional con-
duct and the range of reasonable professional conduct acceptable under
Strickland.43
Although ultimately rejected, the position of the court of appeals is not
without merit. There is arguably a substantive difference between urging a
client to testify truthfully and threatening him into doing so. Threats by an
attorney may have a chilling effect on the attorney-client relationship by
making the client reluctant to be open with his attorney and disclose all
relevant information." It has been universally accepted that such full disclo-
client confidences until he was compelled to do so in response to Whiteside's
post-trial challenge to the quality of his performance. We see this as a case
in which the attorney successfully dissuaded his client from committing the
crime of perjury.
Id.
42. Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d 1323, 1331 (8th Cir. 1984). The Supreme
Court did not agree with the appellate court's understanding of Robinson's statement
to Whiteside that he would probably be allowed to impeach the false testimony. In
Note 7 of the opinion, the Court stated that it found no support in the record for
a threat by Robinson to testify against Whiteside while acting as counsel. Nix v.
Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. at 997 n.7.
43. 106 S. Ct. at 997.
44. Wolfram, Client Perjury, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 809, 836 (1977) ("Imposing
affirmative obligations on an attorney with respect to client perjury will create barriers
between attorney and client that may prevent the attorney from discovering all facts
known by the client and from maintaining the full trust of the client."); cf. Freedman,
Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Ques-
tions, 64 MicH. L. REv. 1469, 1470 (1966). Professor Freedman states:
It is essential to the effective functioning of this system that each adversary
have . . ."entire devotion to the interests of the client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning
and ability." It is also essential to maintain the fullest uninhibited com-
munication between the client and his attorney, so that the attorney can
[Vol. 52
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sure is essential if the attorney is to provide the best representation for his
client, and it is this need for full disclosure that serves as a primary basis
for the attorney-client privilege.45
This argument is bolstered by recognizing the degree of mistrust already
present in the attorney-client relationship and the extent to which the kind
of actions approved of in Nix v. Whiteside will exacerbate the problem. One
commentator has concluded that "[m]any attorneys and clients mistrust one
another notwithstanding their initial hopes and the insistence of the profes-
sion's formal norms that a proper relationship requires mutual trust." 46 Given
the atmosphere of mistrust already present in the relationship between the
client and the criminal defense lawyer, the kind of behavior followed by
Robinson could effectively drive a wedge between defense counsel and
defendants that would render it extremely difficult to provide an adequate
defense.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's reversal of the court of appeals on
this point probably represents the better policy view. Any attempt to dissuade
a client from testifying in a manner which he perceives to be to his advantage
is going to have adverse effects on the attorney-client relationship. On the
other hand, protecting the attorney-client relationship absolutely at the ex-
pense of the attorney's obligation not to use false evidence represents a
serious threat to the integrity of the judicial system. A public impression that
lawsuits are won by the best liar would hardly inspire confidence in the
most effectively counsel his client and advocate the latter's cause.
Id. at 1470.
This concern is not limited to Law Review writers. See, e.g., United States v.
Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 208 (D.C. 1976) ("It [the court] must be wary lest its inquiry
and standards undercut the sensitive relationship between attorney and client and tear
the fabric of the adversary system."); Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 725-26
(1948) ("Undivided allegiance and faithful devoted service to a client are prized
traditions of the American lawyer. It is this kind of service for which the Sixth
Amendment makes provision.").
45. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (1980); MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 comment (1983).
46. Burt, Conflict and Trust Between Attorney and Client, 69 GEO. L.J. 1015
(1981).
It is not surprising that attorneys and clients in criminal defense work
often mistrust one another. They are typically separated by vast differences
in social status and economic prospects. Race differences also accompany
these other indicia of social distance and mutual incomprehension. As if
these barriers to trust were not sufficiently impenetrable, defense attorneys
often believe that most criminal defendants are guilty. ...
Defense attorneys frequently believe that their clients lie to them, un-
dermining the attorney's capacity to give effective representation. Criminal
defendants often believe that their attorneys lie to them and betray them to
their official adversaries.
Id. at 1035 (footnotes omitted).
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adversary system as a fact-finding process. The decision of the Supreme Court
in Nix v. Whiteside can not be said to represent an unreasonable compromise
between these conflicting policies.
It is necessary, however, to understand the precise holding of the Court
in Nix v. Whiteside. The Court held that Robinson's behavior was proper
in that he successfully dissuaded his client from committing perjury, and that
under these facts, he did not unreasonably compromise the attorney-client
relationship. The Court may have been faced with a very different case if
Whiteside had insisted on testifying that he saw a gun, and Robinson had
been forced to actually carry out his proposed response to that testimony.
While the majority opinion in Nix v. Whiteside may provide some insight
to the thoughts of the members of the Court on the ethical questions, it is
important to remember that the principles on which the case was decided
were primarily constitutional rather than ethical. 47 This point is made in the
concurring opinion of Justice Brennan, which states "[t]his Court has no
constitutional authority to establish rules of ethical conduct for lawyers prac-
ticing in the state courts. Nor does the Court enjoy any statutory grant of
jurisdiction over legal ethics." Similarly, in his separate opinion, Justice
Blackmun emphasized that the only issue being decided was whether Robin-
son's actions had deprived Whiteside of a fair trial as guaranteed by the
sixth amendment. 49 Since the decision rests on constitutional considerations,
it is important to understand the nature of Whiteside's constitutional claims
and why they failed.
As a preliminary matter, Robinson had advised Whiteside that he would
seek to withdraw from the case should Whiteside testify falsely. Whether to
actually withdraw is generally the next logical step an attorney must consider
when he has been unsuccessful in his attempts to dissuade his client from
testifying falsely. Withdrawal is an unsatisfactory solution for obvious rea-
47. This was true at the court of appeals level also. Whiteside v. Scurr, 744
F.2d 1323, 1327 (8th Cir. 1984) ("Our analysis does not deal with the ethical problem
inherent in appellant's claim. We are concerned only with the constitutional require-
ments of due process and effective assistance of counsel.").
48. Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. 988, 1000 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring):
Unfortunately, the Court seems unable to resist the temptation of shar-
ing with the legal community its vision of ethical conduct. But let there be
no mistake: the Court's essay regarding what constitutes the correct response
to a criminal client's suggestion that he will perjure himself is pure discourse
without force of law.
Id.
49. Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. at 1000 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Black-
mun was joined in the opinion by Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Stevens. Given
that the author of the majority opinion, Chief Justice Burger, has now left the court,
the significance of the opinion as it pertains to non-constitutional issues is in doubt.
It would seem that Brennan is correct in declaring that the issue has not been decided.
Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. at 1000 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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sons. First, it may not be feasible in the particular case, as the court may
not permit the attorney to withdraw.50 More fundamentally, however, with-
drawal is unsatisfactory because it does not solve the conflict but merely
places it on the shoulders of another attorney, or even less desirable, teaches
the client to lie to his next attorney in order to avoid the conflict the second
time around.5' Thus, while withdrawal may solve the individual attorney's
ethical dilemma, it does not remedy the larger problem facing the adversary
system itself. Because Whiteside testified truthfully and Robinson did not
withdraw from the case, the issue of withdrawal was not presented to the
Court except to the extent that Robinson used it as leverage in coercing
Whiteside to abandon his plan to perjure himself. As such, it was dealt with
together with the other "threats" made in determining whether the making
of such threats denied Whiteside any of his due process rights.
Whiteside argued that Robinson's threatened withdrawal effectively con-
ditioned his continued representation upon testifying in a manner that con-
formed to Robinson's view of the truth, and thus constituted an impermissible
infringement on Whiteside's right to testify in his own behalf. This argument
presupposes a criminal defendant's right to testify, and raises issues similar
to those in cases in which the attorney refuses to put his client on the stand
because he believes the client will commit perjury.
50. This problem is illustrated by Sanborn v. State, 474 So. 2d 309 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1985). Defense counsel in the case sought to withdraw from representation
because the defendant had directed him to present evidence and testimony which
defense counsel knew to be false. The trial court's decision to deny the motion to
withdraw and order representation was upheld on appeal. The court stated that as
long as the trial court has a reasonable basis for belief that the relationship has not
deteriorated to a point where counsel can no longer give effective aid, it is justified
in its denial of a motion to withdraw, and the decision will not be disturbed absent
a clear abuse of discretion. Id. at 314.
On remand to the trial court, defense counsel refused to comply with the trial
court's order to continue with representation and was held to be in contempt of court.
The trial court's decision was again affirmed by the court of appeals. Rubin v. State,
490 So. 2d 1001 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
For further discussion of this issue see Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727 (9th
Cir. 1978) (holding that counsel's moving to withdraw during trial deprived client of
a fair trial); Wolfram, supra note 44.
51. Recognizing this concern, the court in Sanborn v. State, stated:
If withdrawal were allowed every time a lawyer was faced with an ethical
disagreement with the accused, the ultimate result could be a perpetual cycle
of eleventh-hour motions to withdraw and an unlimited number of contin-
uances for the defendant. In addition, new counsel might fail to recognize
the problem of fabricated testimony and false evidence would be presented
to the court, or perhaps the defendant might eventually find an attorney
who lacks ethical standards and who would knowingly present and argue
false evidence.
Sanborn v. State, 474 So. 2d at 314.
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By preventing his client from testifying the attorney certainly avoids
having to present false evidence. He also prevents his client from committing
the crime of perjury, and he, himself, avoids the crime of subornation of
perjury. 2 This course of action may in fact satisfy his conflicting ethical
duty to his client as well. First, the attorney has successfully avoided dis-
closing his client's confidences as required by the codes of ethics. Further,
refusing to allow the client to testify may very well be in the client's best
interests as it will insulate him from the dangers of cross-examination by
opposing counsel and can thus be defended in terms of trial strategy.
In a criminal case, however, the attorney's decision to keep his client
off the stand may be a violation of the client's constitutional rights. The
fifth amendment provides that a criminal defendant shall not be compelled
to be a witness against himself. 3 It does not expressly provide the converse
that a criminal defendant has a right to testify in his own behalf. 4 Through
a long line of cases, however, the Supreme Court has continually indicated
that such a right exists as a corrollary to the fifth amendment, and a number
52. This is a very real threat in some jurisdictions, and particularly in Iowa,
where Whiteside's trial took place. See State v. Whiteside, 272 N.W.2d 468, 471
(Iowa 1978) ("A lawyer who knowingly uses perjured testimony... is himself subject
to disciplinary action, not to mention the possibility of his own prosecution for
suborning perjury."); Committee on Professional Ethics v. Crary, 245 N.W.2d 298
(Iowa 1976) (Supreme Court of Iowa rejected reprimand recommended by its Griev-
ance Commission for attorney's part in presenting perjured testimony in a discovery
deposition, and ordered the attorney's license revoked).
Section 720.3 of the Iowa Code provides:
Suborning Perjury. A person who procures or offers any inducement
to another to make a statement under oath or affirmation in any proceeding
or other matter in which statements under oath or affirmation are required
or authorized, with the intent that such person will make a false statement,
or who procures or offers any inducement to one who the person reasonably
believes will be called upon for a statement in any such proceeding or matter,
to conceal material facts known to such person, commits a class "D" felony.
IOWA CODE § 720.3 (Supp. 1983).
53. The fifth amendment states:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
54. In fact, criminal defendants were disqualified from giving testimony at
common law because of their interest in the case. This disqualification has been
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of lower courts have so held.5 The import of these decisions is that the
ultimate decision of whether the defendant will testify is outside the attorney's
control of trial strategy and rests personally with the defendant. If the defend-
ant insists on testifying, the attorney cannot constitutionally prevent him
from doing so. 5 6 Whiteside argued that, since he had a constitutional right
to testify, Robinson's threats impermissibly infringed on the free exercise of
that right by forcing him to testify in the manner Robinson prescribed.
This argument is in line with a pure view of the adversary system in
mandating that the attorney allow the client to testify perjuriously, thereby
sacrificing the policy against using false evidence to the presumably larger
value of maintaining the attorney-client relationship.5 7 This argument is prem-
ised on the assumption that the attorney-client relationship is essential to the
adversary system and in need of protection. While perjury presents a threat
55. In the case of In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948) (Black, J.), the Court
stated that rights basic to our system include "as a minimum, a right to examine the
witnesses against [the defendant], to offer testimony, and to be represented by coun-
sel." Cf. Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972) (Brennan, J.) (holding it uncon-
stitutional to condition a defendant's right to testify on his being the first defense
witness to give testimony); Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d 1323, 1329 (8th Cir. 1984)
("We hold that criminal defendants have the constitutional right to testify"); United
States v. Bifield, 702 F.2d 342, 347 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 931 (1985)
(stating that although whether a defendant has a right to testify has never been
authoritatively settled, the court believes that such a right exists); Alicia v. Gagnon,
675 F.2d 913, 921 (7th Cir. 1982) (overruling prior case law which held that the right
to testify stemmed only from statutory abrogation of incompetency) (an exhaustive
survey of authorities is contained in note 15 of the opinion); Wright v. Estelle, 572
F.2d 1071, 1074 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1004 (1978) (Godbold, J.,
dissenting) (arguing for a constitutional right to testify).
56. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (accused has the ultimate au-
thority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding the case, as to whether to
plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal); United
States v. Curtis, 742 F.2d 1070, 1076 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1374
(1986) (a defendant's personal constitutional right to testify truthfully in his own
behalf may not be waived by counsel as a matter of trial strategy); cf. Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (Stewart, J.) (counsel is only an assistant to the
defendant and not the master, though once accepted, counsel should control trial
strategy).
57. The foremost proponent of this position has been Professor Monroe
Freedman. The argument was made in his article, Professional Responsibility of the
Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1469
(1966), in which he argued against keeping a defendant off the stand should he
communicate an intent to commit perjury:
There is a clear consensus among prosecutors and defense attorneys that
the likelihood of conviction is increased enormously when the defendant
does not take the stand. Consequently, the attorney who prevents his client
from testifying only because the client has confided his guilt to him is
violating that confidence by acting upon the information in a way that will
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to the fact-finding process, it is one the system is equipped to handle, albeit
imperfectly, through the mechanisms of cross-examination and determination
of witnesses' credibility by the fact-finder.58 In contrast, the system has no
means to guard against the damage caused by undermining the relationship
of trust between an attorney and client. If the adversary system is truly
"based upon the presupposition that the most effective means of determining
truth is to present to a judge and jury a clash between proponents of con-
flicting views," 5 9 then the attorney-client relationship should be jealously
guarded to ensure that those conflicting views are adequately represented,
even at the expense of allowing a defendant to testify falsely.
This argument was misplaced in Whiteside's case, however, because Ro-
binson did not prevent Whiteside from testifying. Whiteside was able to
testify concerning his self-defense theory and was aided by counsel in de-
veloping his defense. He was prevented only from testifying that he actually
saw a gun.60 While Robinson's actions almost certainly harmed his relation-
ship with Whiteside, that harm did not rise to the level which would have
occurred had Whiteside been prevented from testifying. It is clear from all
three appellate opinions 61 that Robinson had been informed of all facts rel-
evant to the case, prepared a competent defense for his client, and aided the
client in establishing that defense on the witness stand. Whatever Whiteside's
personal feelings toward Robinson, it is clear that the ultimate objectives of
the attorney-client relationship were achieved. Any slight compromise of that
relationship was justifiable in preventing the introduction of false testimony. 62
Whiteside's only other claim to prejudice concerning his right to testify
in his own behalf would necessarily require that he possess not only a right
58. This position was eloquently stated by Justice Black in In re Michael, 326
U.S. 224 (1945), in which the Court ruled that committing perjury could not support
a conviction for contempt or obstructing justice. Although Justice Blackmun's con-
curring opinion quotes this passage by Justice Black, the meaning is distorted unless
reproduced in full:
All perjured relevant testimony is at war with justice, since it may
produce a judgement not resting on truth. Therefore it cannot be denied
that it tends to defeat the sole ultimate objective of a trial. It need not
necessarily, however, obstruct or halt the judicial process. For the function
of a trial is to sift the truth from a mass of contradictory evidence, and to
do so the fact finding tribunal must hear both truthful and false witnesses.
Id. at 227.
59. Freedman, supra note 44, at 1470.
60. Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. 988, 997 (1986).
61. Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986); Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d
1323 (8th Cir. 1984); State v. Whiteside, 272 N.W.2d 468 (Iowa 1978).
62. It should be emphasized again at this point that only the use of threats
are claimed to have been justified to prevent the introduction of false testimony. Had
Whiteside insisted on testifying that he "saw" a gun, and Robinson then taken
affirmative action, the question would be whether any of Whiteside's sixth amendment
rights had been violated. That question is explored infra.
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14
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 2 [1987], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol52/iss2/7
CLIENT PERJURY
to testify generally, but a right to testify falsely. Such an argument would
make any attempt to interfere with a defendant's intent to perjure himself
unconstitutional. While a criminal defendant probably does have a right to
testify, 63 it is clear that the right is not absolute so as to include a right to
commit perjury.64 Thus, Whiteside's claim that his right to testify in his own
behalf was infringed because it was conditioned upon his testifying truthfully
was without merit, and the Court so held.6 5
Had Robinson been unsuccessful in deterring Whiteside from lying on
the stand, he would have been squarely faced with the problem of how to
deal ethically with his client's conduct. The attorney may run afoul of the
sixth amendment's guarantee of a right to counsel in selecting the proper
course of conduct at this juncture.6
63. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
64. A number of cases come down squarely against the right to commit per-
jury. See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), in which the Court permitted
a statement obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona to be introduced for purposes
of impeaching a defendant who had testified perjuriously. The Court said "Every
criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense, or to refuse to do so.
But that privilege cannot be construed to include the right to commit perjury." Id.
at 225; cf. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626 (1980) (allowing evidence
obtained in violation of the fourth amendment to be used for purposes of impeach-
ment, in which the Court stated that "when defendants testify, they must testify
truthfully or suffer the consequences"); United States v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77 (1969)
(a defendant's fifth amendment right against self-incrimination did not give him the
right to submit fraudulent forms in order to avoid incrimination even when he was
required to file the forms); United States v. Curtis, 742 F.2d 1070, 1076 (7th Cir.
1984) ("It is equally clear ... that a defendant has no constitutional right to testify
perjuriously in his own behalf.").
65. Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. at 998. This position is supported by language
from Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980). In responding to the argument that
allowing his pre-arrest silence to be used for impeachment purposes should he choose
to testify infringed upon the defendant's right to testify, the Court stated, "The
Constitution does not forbid every government-imposed choice in the criminal process
that has the effect of discouraging the exercise of constitutional rights .... The
threshold question is whether compelling the election impairs to an appreciable extent
any of the policies behind the rights involved." Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. at
236 (citations omitted). But see United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 629 (1980)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court's intrusion on the defendant's "un-
fettered right" to elect whether or not to testify in his own behalf).
66. The sixth amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have com-
pulsory process of obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assist-
ance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Supreme Court made the right to counsel applicable
to the states under the fourteenth amendment in the landmark case of Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1965).
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Denial of a defendant's right to counsel may result from state action
which in some way interferes with the right to counsel, or from incompetent
representation by defense counsel. The most obvious example of state inter-
ference with the right to counsel is a refusal to allow an attorney to represent
a defendant, or more typically, a failure to appoint an attorney to a defendant
who cannot afford one.67 These circumstances result in a total denial of
counsel, and there is no difficulty in'finding that they violate the sixth amend-
ment. However, as the Court made clear in Powell v. Alabama,68 counsel
must be more than counsel in name only; the defendant is entitled to effective
assistance. 69
This requirement that the assistance of counsel must be effective assist-
ance to satisfy the sixth amendment has led to a class of cases holding that
certain state court restrictions on the manner in which defense counsel may
present his case are in conflict with the sixth amendment. 70 The sixth amend-
ment also prohibits state practices which interfere with the relationship be-
tween a defendant and his attorney. 7' It is clear from these cases that the
state may not interfere with a defendant's right to have an attorney zealously
advocate his interests in a criminal proceeding. As stated by the Court in
67. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1965). For a discussion of the
problems concerning compensation of court-appointed counsel for indigent defend-
ants, see State ex rel. Wolff v. Ruddy, 617 S.W.2d 64 (Mo. 1981).
68. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). The case involved a number of out-of-state black men
accused of raping two white girls on a train in Alabama. The trial judge appointed
the entire local bar as counsel, with the result that no member of the bar took the
initiative in preparing a defense until the day the trial began.
69. Defendants facing felony charges are entitled to the effective assistance
of competent counsel. McMann v. Richardson, 379 U.S. 759, 771 (1970); see also
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932) ("[The defendant] requires the guiding
hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings."); cf. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 463 (1963) (the right to be heard is valueless without the aid of counsel).
The important role counsel plays in the adversary system is apparent also in
cases finding that a defendant has a right to have counsel present at line-ups. See
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 225 (1967) ("The plain wording of this [right
to counsel] guarantee thus encompasses counsel's assistance whenever necessary to
assure a meaningful 'defense"'); see also Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977); Gilbert
v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
70. See, e.g., Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976) (trial court order
preventing defendant from conferring with counsel during seventeen hour recess be-
tween defendant's direct examination and his cross-examination ruled unconstitu-
tional); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975) (state law giving trial judge
discretion to deny opportunity for closing summation to defense counsel held un-
constitutional); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972) (court rule requiring defend-
ant to be the first witness if he elected to testify held unconstitutional); Ferguson v.
Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961).
71. For cases involving eavesdropping on attorney-client conversations, see
O'Brien v. United States, 386 U.S. 345 (1967); Black v. United States, 385 U.S. 26
(1966); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
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Herring v. New York,7 2 "the right to the assistance of counsel has been
understood to mean that there can be no restrictions upon the function of
counsel in defending a criminal prosecution in accord with the traditions of
the adversary fact finding process."17 3
Stated in other words, the sixth amendment requires that the prosecu-
tion's case be forced to withstand the crucible of adversary testing74 by an
independent advocate dedicated to the interests of his client. 75 The defense
counsel is imposed between the defendant and the state to ensure that the
defendant does not stand alone. 76 This purpose would be defeated were de-
fense counsel to be placed under restrictions that effectively converted him
into a tool for the prosecution in its efforts to convict. 77
The ethical rules adopted by the Iowa Supreme Court arguably repre-
sented an impermissible intrusion on the attorney's freedom to vigorously
advocate his client's cause by obligating Robinson to compromise his duty
of loyalty to his client. Writing for the Court in Glasser v. United States,7"
Justice Murphy stated that in all cases the constitutional safeguards are to
be "jealously preserved for the benefit of the accused." 79 A state imposed
code of ethics compromising the attorney-client relationship in any way would
be in contravention of the spirit, if not the letter, of the sixth amendment.
The argument proves too much, however, as it would serve to invalidate
any code of ethics by which a state would seek to regulate the conduct of
attorneys. Moreover, it rests on the fallacious notion that the rift in the
relationship between Robinson and Whiteside was caused by the Iowa Code
of Professional Responsibilty for Lawyers, when it actually was the result
of Whiteside's desire to commit perjury. Therefore, Whiteside's sixth amend-
ment claim could not rest on an impermissible government interference with
the function of counsel.
72. 422 U.S. 853 (1975).
73. Herring, 422 U.S. at 857.
74. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
75. As Justice Brennan has stated: "To satisfy the Constitution, counsel must
function as an advocate for the defendant as opposed to a friend of the court."
Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 758 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967)); cf. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948).
76. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967). "Ihe core purpose of
the counsel guarantee was to assure assistance at trial, when the accused was con-
fronted with both the intricacies of the law and the advocacy of the public prose-
cutor." United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 654 (1984) (quoting United States v.
Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 309 (1973)).
77. In this context, recall the language of the court of appeals, holding that,
in Robinson's zeal to prevent Whiteside from perjuring himself, Robinson effectively
became an agent for the prosecution. Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d 1323, 1331 (8th
Cir. 1984).
78. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
79. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 67 (1942).
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The fact that Whiteside's sixth amendment claim could not be predicated
on any impermissible state action does not mean that he may not have been
denied the effective assistance of counsel. The notion that a deprivation of
counsel may occur when the performance of the attorney representing the
defendant falls below acceptable standards is well settled. s0 However, arguing
that one's right to counsel has been denied because of incompetent counsel
is much more difficult than arguing that it has been denied by state inter-
ference. Since the state is not involved in and has no control over the planning
and presentation of the defense, 81 there is no need to discourage misconduct
on the part of the government and hence it is difficult to establish a com-
pelling reason to take away the government's conviction on appeal.
The case establishing the standards for a claim of ineffective counsel is
Strickland v. Washington . 2 The Court in that case created a two-prong test
that a criminal defendant must satisfy in order to successfully maintain that
his sixth amendment right to counsel was violated. The defendant must show
that counsel did not meet reasonable standards of effectiveness, and that
those inadequacies caused actual prejudice to the defendant. In other words,
the attorney must be so incompetent as to undermine confidence in the
outcome of the trial.8 3 Having once determined that the ethical obligations
placed on an attorney by the code of ethics adopted in the state in which he
practices do not constitute a state imposed interference with the right to
counsel,84 it becomes necessary to evaluate an attorney's responses to client
perjury under the standards of Strickland v. Washington.
For reasons already discussed,8 5 withdrawal is an unsatisfactory solution
to the ethical conflict presented by a client determined to perjure himself.
Assuming that the attorney does not withdraw, what options are available?
The American Bar Association's proposed standard 4-7.786 cautions that
lending aid to perjury or using perjured testimony is unprofessional conduct.
80. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
81. This responsibility rests with the defendant and his attorney. See MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 (1983); STANDARDS RELATING TO Tr
ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 4-5.1 (1982); see also supra note 66 and
accompanying text.
82. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Defendant Washington was sentenced to death after
pleading guilty to three murders against the advice of counsel. He challenged counsel's
failure to present character witnesses at the sentencing hearing. The decision not to
present character witnesses "reflected trial counsel's sense of hopelessness about over-
coming the evidentiary effect of respondent's confessions to the gruesome crimes."
Id. at 671-73.
83. Id. at 687.
84. See supra text accompanying notes 74-75.
85. See supra text accompanying note 46.
86. STANDARDS RELATING TO Tim ADmINISTRATION OF CRunAL JUSTICE (1982).
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The proposed standard recommends making a record, which is not to be
revealed to the court, that the defendant is taking the stand against the advice
of counsel. The lawyer is then advised to avoid conventional direct exami-
nation on matters on which the defendant intends to testify falsely, allowing
the defendant to engage instead in a "free narrative. 8 7 Finally, the lawyer
should not argue the false version of the facts or use the perjured testimony
in any way in his closing argument.88
Though the approach advocated by standard 4-7.7 has been approved
in two circuits,8 9 it also is unacceptable. The free narrative approach is an
obvious attempt to compromise between the competing values involved in
client perjury, but one that sacrifices both values while advancing neither.
Although depriving the defendant counsel's aid in presenting perjured tes-
timony presumably renders such testimony less effective, it nevertheless al-
lows the introduction of false testimony. Such a result should only be justified
where a policy of greater significance is furthered, in this case, the attorney-
client relationship. However, the free narrative approach fails in this respect
also. Professor Freedman argues that letting the client take the stand without
the attorney's participation, and omission of the testimony in closing argu-
ment, is as damaging as failing to argue the case and as improper as telling
the jury that the client had lied in his testimony.90 In fact, such a departure
from ordinary trial tactics would serve as an obvious tip-off to the court
that the attorney believed his client was lying, thereby severly prejudicing his
cause.9' Further, such action arguably amounts to a deprivation of counsel,
as "[t]he right to be heard is valueless without the aid of counsel." 92 In order
to present a defense, the defendant "requires the guiding hand of counsel
at every step in the proceedings against him. ' 93 It is senseless to compromise
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir. 1984); Lowery v. Cardwell,
575 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1978).
90. Freedman, supra note 44, at 1477. Professor Freedman's conclusion was
that the adversary system allowed no alternative to putting a perjurious witness on
the stand without implicit or explicit disclosure of the attorney's knowledge to either
judge or jury. Id.
91. Freedman, supra note 44; Wolfram, supra note 44.
92. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938).
93. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932). Similarly, in Ferguson v.
Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961), the Court ruled it unconstitutional to deny the defend-
ant the assistance of counsel's questioning in presenting a statement. Later, in Gilbert
v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 279 (1967), it was stated:
The Court considers the "right to a fair trial" to be the overriding aim
of the right to counsel .... But ... this Court lacks constitutional power
thus to balance away a defendant's absolute right to counsel .... The Fra-
mers did not declare in the Sixth Amendment that a defendant is entitled
to a "fair trial," nor that he is entitled to counsel on the condition that
this Court thinks there is more than a "minimal risk" that without a lawyer
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the defendant's right to counsel while still allowing the introduction of per-
jured testimony. If the defendant is to be allowed to present his perjured
defense at all, he has the right to do so effectively. If the defendant is to be
denied the right to present such a defense effectively, then he should not be
permitted to perjure himself at all. An additional concern running through
any discussion of the proper response to client perjury is the possibility that,
in taking measures to prevent the commission of perjury, the attorney may
reveal client confidences. The present ethical codes permit an attorney to
reveal client secrets for this limited purpose, 94 but such a position is subject
to attack as an unwise doctrine "that would open the door to a fundamental
reordering of the adversary system into a system more inquisitorial in na-
ture." 95 It can only be assumed that many criminal defense lawyers, when
faced with the choice of injuring their client's cause through a permitted
disclosure of client confidences or risking disciplinary action for maintaining
those confidences, will protect themselves first at the expense of their client
by revealing client secrets. It cannot be disputed that such a result poses a
serious threat to the adversary system, and indeed may make it more in-
quisitorial.
However grave these issues may be, they were not raised in Whiteside's
case.96 Strickland v. Washington97 requires the petitioner to demonstrate that
he suffered prejudice as a result of ineffective counsel. 9 Whiteside was unable
to meet this burden. The only thing he was prevented from doing was com-
mitting perjury. Since the Court made clear that there exists no right to
his trial will be "unfair."
388 U.S. at 279 (Black, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
94. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsILTrrY DR 4-101(C)(3) (1982);
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983); see also Clark v. United
States, 289 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1933) (Cardozo, J.). In Clark, Justice Cardozo stated:
The recognition of a privilege does not mean that it is without conditions
or exceptions .... There is a privilege protecting communications between
attorney and client. The privilege takes flight if the relationship is abused.
A client who consults an attorney for advice in the commission of a fraud
will have no help from the law. He must let the truth be told.
Clark, 289 U.S. at 15.
95. United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 208 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
96. Robinson did not reveal any client confidences until Whiteside challenged
his performance. Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. 988, 997 (1986).
97. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
98. In this respect, Strickland v. Washington rejected the statements in earlier
cases concerning the right to counsel. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76
(1942) ("The right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute
to allow the courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice
arising from its denial."); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (Stewart, J.)
(arguing that rejection of a harmless error standard in right to counsel cases was the
whole point of Gideon v. Wainwright).
[Vol. 52
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commit perjury, 99 Robinson's actions deprived Whiteside of no right, and
confidence in the outcome of the trial was not undermined.
Realizing that he could not demonstrate any actual prejudice on the
facts of his case, Whiteside attempted to bring himself within a narrow line
of cases in which the Court has been willing to presume prejudice to the
defendant. The principal case for this proposition is Cuyler v. Sullivan, 10o in
which the Court held that prejudice need not be actually demonstrated when
the accused has successfully shown that his counsel was under a conflict of
interest. 101 Whiteside claimed that Robinson's conflicting ethical obligations
to the court and his client created a conflict of interest that was presumptively
prejudicial. However, the utility to Whiteside of Cuyler v. Sullivan was ex-
tremely limited because of the narrow holding of that case. While the Court
in Cuyler was willing to presume prejudice upon finding a conflict of interest,
that conflict had to be actually demonstrated. The mere fact that defense
counsel simultaneously represented two defendants was not enough to war-
rant reversal unless it could be demonstrated that the interests of the different
defendants were actually in conflict.' °2
Proving such a conflict of interest was not easy for Whiteside, and the
Court rejected his attempt to bring his case under the conflict of interest
umbrella. The Court made clear that the doctrine applies to cases where
defense counsel represents different clients whose interests are opposed to
each other, not to cases involving lawyers who are put under conflicting
ethical duties while representing a single client. 03 Further, the Court noted
that it would be improper for Whiteside to claim the benefit of a conflict
that he created by communicating his intention to commit perjury.' °4 Since
the Court refused to find that Robinson's situation constituted a conflict of
interest as envisaged by Cuyler v. Sullivan, Whiteside was denied a pre-
sumption of prejudice.
Without the benefit of presumed prejudice, Whiteside was unable to
demonstrate that Robinson's actions had actually prejudiced his cause, and
99. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
100. 446 U.S. 335 (1980). Two privately retained lawyers represented all three
defendants in their separate murder trials arising from the same crime. Sullivan alleged
that the interests of the three defendants were in conflict, and that counsel withheld
evidence in his trial so as to aid the other defendants in the upcoming proceedings.
Id. at 337-40.
101. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980); accord Wood v. Georgia, 450
U.S. 261 (1981); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942); United States ex rel.
Hart v. Davenport, 478 F.2d 203 (3d Cir. 1973). In addition, a lawyer has an ethical
obligation to avoid conflicts of interest. See MODEL RULES OF PROFEssIoNAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.7 (1983); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONA. RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101(A) (1982).
102. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 350; accord Holloway v. Arkansas, 435
U.S. 475 (1978); Walker v. United States, 422 F.2d 374 (3d Cir. 1970).
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without a showing of prejudice he could not maintain a successful deprivation
case under Strickland v. Washington. Therefore, it was unnecessary to the
holding of the case to determine whether Robinson's actions were ethically
proper. This point is made in the concurring opinions to Nix v. Whiteside,0 5
which emphasize that the concurring Justices decided the case only on the
issue of prejudice. As a result, it remains unclear whether Robinson's threats
against his client were ethically proper,'06 though the decision indicates at
least that such threats are not unconstitutional when their only effect is to
successfully dissuade a client from testifying falsely.
In the final analysis it must be recognized that Nix v. Whiteside presented
perhaps the worst set of facts upon which to base a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. Though the tone of Robinson's threats against his
client were ominous, the actual effect was not substantial. 0 7 The Court's
opinion may suggest a lack of sympathy for defendants prevented from
testifying in an allegedly perjurious manner, but it is impossible to predict
how the Court would react to a case in which it is forced to seriously weigh
the different policies in conflict and make a determination as to which de-
serves the greater protection. Such a decision could have a serious effect on
the sanctity of the attorney-client relationship if the Court were to approve
the actions that Robinson threatened, and could significantly alter the nature
of the adversary system in this country.
MnKE W. BARTOLACCI
105. Concurring opinions were filed by Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Ste-
vens. Justice Blackmun argued that under Strickland v. Washington, a petitioner had
to satisfy both prongs of the test, but there was no reason not to dispose of the case
on the basis of only one prong. Since Whiteside clearly was not constitutionally
prejudiced, the case should be decided on that basis alone. Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S.
Ct. at 1002.
106. Indeed, as Justice Brennan argued, it was not within the power of the
Court to make such a determination. Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. at 1000 (Brennan,
J., concurring).
107. Forcing a defendant to testify he "knew" there was a gun, as opposed
to he "saw" a gun does not represent a significant difference in the testimony being
presented and may explain Robinson's success in convincing Whiteside to change his
story. A much more insistent defendant can be expected when his proposed testimony
differs substantially from the attorney's view of the facts.
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